Divorce after Professional School: Education and Future Earning Capacity May Be Marital Property--In re Marriage of Horstmann by Pinnell, Robert E.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 44 
Issue 2 Spring 1979 Article 7 
Spring 1979 
Divorce after Professional School: Education and Future Earning 
Capacity May Be Marital Property--In re Marriage of Horstmann 
Robert E. Pinnell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert E. Pinnell, Divorce after Professional School: Education and Future Earning Capacity May Be 
Marital Property--In re Marriage of Horstmann, 44 MO. L. REV. (1979) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
RECENT CASES
an ADEA complainant a choice of forums, the Holliday court eliminates
this problem and achieves judicial harmonization of state and federal age
discrimination in employment laws.
Under the Holliday decision an older worker is now allowed to choose
the quicker of the two available remedies and is not compelled to select the
state remedy if that would unduly impede a prompt resolution of his
grievance. This interpretation is consistent with the congressional purpose
behind the ADEA and the remedial nature of the federal act. 65 Finally,
allowing an aggrieved individual a choice of forums in which to bring his
action may encourage all states, and especially states which are without
age discrimination in employment laws, to enact age discrimination laws
that are equal or superior to the federal law. The development of such laws
would help facilitate efforts by the state agency charged with mediating
age discrimination in employment disputes to resolve such complaints
rapidly and at a minimum expense to the parties. These state laws would
also provide an incentive for citizens to bring their complaints into state




SCHOOL: EDUCATION AND FUTURE
EARNING CAPACITY MAY BE MARITAL
PROPERTY
In re Marriage of Horstmann
Donna Horstmann worked at a bank while her husband, Randall, at-
tended law school from 1973 to 1976. She contributed her pay to the
family's living expenses. In 1976, Randall received his degree and was ad-
mitted to the bar. That same year Donna filed a petition for dissolution of
their marriage, and the trial court dissolved the marriage. Noting the
65. See note 50 supra.
66. The legislative history of the ADEA supports this interpetation. See Vaz-
quez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (D.P.R. 1975), citing
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE ON S. 830, and S. 788, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 48
(1967) (testimony of Secretary Wirtz), reprinted in 113 CONG. REC. 31255 (1967).
1. 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
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dearth of other assests in the marriage, the court ordered Randall to pay
$18,000, by future periodic payments, for the property division. 2 The
Iowa Supreme Court, in affirming the decree,3 became the first appellate
court in the country to classify the increase in a spouse's potential earning
capacity, made possible by the other spouse's efforts during marriage, as a
marital asset subject to property distribution upon dissolution.4
Although the Horstmann holding would be equally applicable
regardless of which spouse played the supporting role, more often than not
it is the woman, through her financial support, who is brightening her hus-
band's professional prospects by supporting him through professional
school.' The Horstmann court's recognition of the wife's expectancies in
the resulting increase in her husband's potential earning capacity, and of
her entitlement to compensation for the loss of such expectancies upon
dissolution, is indicative of the startling metamorphosis of the wife's role
since common law. A marked evolution has removed the wife, in the eyes
of the law, from a position of passive dependence upon her husband and
his guardianship6 to one resembling a partner of her husband.7 The theory
that marriage is a partnership, with both individuals working as partners
for the betterment of the family unit, is a concept that an increasing
2. Id. at 888.
3. Reviews of decrees granting dissolution of marriage are de novo in Iowa.
In re Marriage of Novak, 220 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Iowa 1974). Mo. R. CIV. P.
73.01 also states that, in an appeal of a dissolution action, the appellate court
should consider the evidence de novo. But decisions have emphasized giving due
deference to the trial judge's findings and reversal is permitted only if the judg-
ment of the trial court was clearly erroneous. Pope v. Pope, 520 S.W.2d 634 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1975). See Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution,
43 Mo. L. REV. 157, 160 (1978).
4. Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1974) was a precursor of
Horstmann. In awarding "permanent alimony" the court was influenced by the
wife's support of the husband from eleventh grade through medical school. The
resulting increase in the husband's earning capacity was a factor in the large
amount of permanent alimony granted. This amount would not terminate upon
remarriage or death. As in Horstmann, the court was influenced by the lack of
other marital property to divide.
5. In a 1972 survey of major schools women comprised 6% of the total
enrollments in architecture, 12% in law, 13% in medicine, 5% in optometry,
14% in veterinary medicine. Parrish, Women in Professional Training, MON-
THLY LABOR REV., May 1974, at 41. "The wife's involvement with her husband's
career frequently begins before the career itself, during the stage when he is
undergoing the advanced training so typical of these middle-class careers, while
she is working in a temporary job to support them both, having abandoned or in-
terrupted her own studies." Papanek, Men, Women and Work: Reflections on
the Two Person Career, 78 AM.J. Soc. 852, 858 (1973).
6. See Comment, Marital Property: A New Look at Old Inequities, 39
ALB. L. REV. 52, 53 (1974).
7. The notion of marriage as a partnership was fostered originally in the
community property states. Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolu-
tion, 43 Mo. L. REV. 157, 158 (1978).
[Vol. 44330
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number of jurisdictions have come to accept. 8 The Horstmann decision
further enhances this marital partnership notion by acknowledging that
the potential for increase in the future earning capacity of one spouse ac-
quired with the aid of the other during the marriage is a marital asset sub-
ject to division upon dissolution.9
Apart from Horstmann, all jurisdictions that have passed on the issue
have consistently rejected attempts to characterize as a marital asset the
future earning capacity, education, or professional degree of the
husband.' 0 There are several rationales that support the view taken by
these jurisdictions. First, a professional degree lacks most of the attributes
ordinarily associated with property. A degree has no standard barter or ex-
change value, it cannot be assigned or sold, and it is a manifestation of
much more than tuition and lab fees." It is personal in nature, the
culmination of years of intensive labors by the student spouse. Since these
same characteristics are attributes of potential earning capacity, potential
earning capacity also lacks most of the attributes normally associated with
property. 12
In addition, the valuation of potential earning capacity for purposes of
property division upon dissolution poses a complex problem. Like non-
vested pension rights, an education13 or a degree carries with it no
8. This notion is a relatively new theory in Missouri. See Forsythe v. For-
sythe, 558 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); RSMO § 452.330 (Supp. 1975);
Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 MO. L. REv. 157, 158
(1978); Comment, Tax Consequences of Interspousal Property Transfers Pur-
suant to a Missouri Dissolution, 44 Mo. L. REV. 92, 95 (1979) (deferred com-
munity property).
9. Missouri has not yet spoken to this issue directly. Missouri's property
division statute, RSMO § 452.330 (Supp. 1975) and that of Colorado, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-113 (1977), are virtually the same. Hence, In re Marriage of
Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978), or its strong dissenting opinion could in-
fluence Missouri courts. With In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1976), the husband's earning capacity was not an independent
asset, but there was a 74% -26% split of property based largely on the wife's finan-
cial contribution to the husband's legal education. See Krauskopf, Martial Pro-
perty at Marriage Dissolution, 43 MO. L. REV. 157, 166-68 (1978).
10. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969) (a law
degree is, at best, an intangible property right which cannot have a monetary
value placed upon it for division between spouses); In re Marriage of Graham,
574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978) (M.B.A. acquired by the husband during marriage is
not a property asset to be divided upon dissolution); Stem v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340,
331 A.2d 257 (1975) (a person's earning capacity, even where its development has
been aided and enhanced by the supporting spouse, should not be a separate
marital asset to be included in the property division).
11. In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978).
12. Horstmann is the first court to make a questionable distinction: the legal
education in itself is not a marital asset, but the future earning capacity derived
from it is. 263 N.W.2d at 889.
13. "If a spouse's education preparing him for the practice of the law can be
said to be 'community property,' a proposition which is extremely doubtful even
though the education is acquired with community moneys, it manifestly is of such
1979]
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guarantee that it will in fact provide any future earnings.1 4 At any time,
the professional could change professions, become disabled, or die.' 5
There is consequently a danger that the value of an individual's potential
earning capacity may be ascertained only through speculation. Indeed,
the primary reason for refusing to recognize potential earning capacity as a
marital asset undoubtedly has been the fear that valuation of such an item
would be too speculative or conjectural. 16
Finally, classifying potential earning capacity as a marital asset may be
an unnecessary complication. A wife's financial input to the education of
her husband, the wife's enhancement of the husband's financial status or
earning capacity, and the earning capacities of both husband and wife are
factors that courts normally consider in the determination of the division
of marital property 7 and the award of maintenance. 15 In most situations a
a character that a monetary value for division with the other spouse cannot be
placed upon it." Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134
(1969). The court in Todd held that education was at best an intangible property
right and likened its position to the right to practice a profession. In California
the right to practice a profession is not community property. Franklin v.
Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 725, 155 P.2d 637, 641 (1945).
14. Randall Horstmann used this argument before the trial court. 263
N.W.2d at 889. Non-vested pension rights are generally not considered marital
property. See Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 172. An exception to this general rule is
In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1976), which held that pension rights, whether vested or not, represent marital
property interests to the extent derived from employment during marriage.
15. The trial court in Horstmann noted, "naturally there is no guarantee
that Respondent would have a good paying job during the time he was in law
school or that his practice of law will be a financial success." 263 N.W.2d at 888.
16. See, e.g., Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 344-45, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (1975).
The same has been held when an attempt was made to value a spouse's legal
education. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134-35
(1969).
17. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 507-08, 176 P.2d 363, 364
(1946) (wife during marriage, in addition to household duties, performed services
which contributed to husband's business advantage and resulted in an increase in
value of the property division accorded her); Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196,
510 P.2d 905, 906-07 (1973) (that the wife taught school and paid for family
expenses while her husband attended medical school was a consideration in the
adjustment of property rights); In re Marriage of Cornell, 550 S.W.2d 823, 826
(Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977) (wife's contribution of working while her husband
attended college and her work as a mother and a homemaker were considered as
factors in determining the property division); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 345,
331 A.2d 257, 260 (1975) (the increase in potential earning capacity aided by the
supporting spouse was a factor to consider in both the property distribution and
alimony).
18. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236, 242 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1976) (husband's prior and anticipated earning capacity factors in deter-
mining amount of maintenance); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 193 Neb. 615, 615-17,
228 N.W.2d 594, 595-96 (1975) (wife's help in the prospering of her husband's
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wife can be adequately compensated for her contribution to her husband's
education and for her subsequent loss of expectations through
maintenance awards and the division of traditional forms of marital assets
without the need to characterize the husband's potential earning capacity,
itself, as a marital asset.
The rationales against including earning capacity and education in
divisible marital property are logical and have appeal. However, they are
susceptible to critical analysis.
Merely because courts normally take into consideration a wife's finan-
cial contribution to the increase in her husband's potential earning capaci-
ty as a factor in the determination of maintenance and property division
does not guarantee the wife adequate compensation for her loss of expec-
tancies upon dissolution. There are situations in which neither an award of
maintenance nor a division of traditional forms of marital assets will suffi-
ciently compensate the wife for such sacrifices. Horstmann is a pointed ex-
ample of such a circumstance. A scarcity of other assests at the date of
dissolution leaves the supporting spouse with little unless she is entitled to
share in the acquired increase in potential earning capacity.
Likewise, if prospective earnings were only used as a relevant element
in determining alimony or maintenance, the working wife in a situation
such as Horstmann would be left with an extremely tenuous grasp upon
what had been her reasonable expectations. Alimony and maintenance
generally terminate with remarriage or death,19 whereas property division
payments in periodic form usually do not. 20 Moreover, under the statutes
of some states, if the wife is self-supporting she is not entitled to
maintenance. 21
Lastly, although there is clearly a danger that valuing an individual's
ed relevant in fixing alimony); Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 575-77,
209 N.W.2d 585, 586-87 (1973) (wife's considerable contribution of working
while her husband attended medical school weighed in alimony determination);
Stern v. Stern, 66 NJ. 340, 345, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (1975) (the increase in poten-
tial earning capacity aided by the supporting spouse was a factor to consider in
both the property division and alimony).
19. H. BASS & M. REIN, DIVORCE LAW-THE COMPLETE PRACTICAL
GUIDE 125 (1976).
20. See Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281, 287 (Fla. 1953);
Maybaum v. Maybaum, 349 Ill. App. 80, 82, 110 N.E.2d 78, 79 (1952); Knipfer
v. Knipfer, 144 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 1966); Tracy v. Tracy, 205 S.W.2d 947,
948 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947); Stuart v. Stuart, 555 P.2d 611, 615 (Okla. 1976). See
also Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 270 (1956); Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 318 (1956). Even if
called alimony by the trial court, appellate courts have tended to look to the
essence of a transaction to determine if it is a property settlement or decree.
Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281, 288 (Fla. 1953); International Trust
Co. v. Liebhardt, 111 Colo. 208, 218, 139 P.2d 264, 269 (1943).
21. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-114 (1973); RSMo § 452.335 (Supp. 1975).
There are also income tax considerations that may be important in this regard.
See generally I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (alimony and separate maintenance payments).
1979] 333
5
Pinnell: Pinnell: Divorce after Professional School:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
potential earning capacity would involve speculation, the presence of such
a danger is not a valid reason for rejecting attempts to classify a potential
for increase in future earning capacity as a marital asset. Valuing good-
will, an item that is nothing more than the expectation of future
patronage, is certainly as amorphous an assessment as would be the valu-
ing of potential earning capacity. Professional goodwill is "personal in
nature and not a readily marketable commodity." 22 Nevertheless, courts
frequently have placed a value on goodwill and have included it, as marital
property, in the property division at dissolution.23 In addition there are
several available methods of valuing potential earning capacity in which
the danger of speculation and conjecture is to some extent mitigated. For
instance, in determining damages in tort actions for personal injury or
wrongful death, inchoate skills and educations traditionally are taken into
account in assessing the decrease in future earnings resulting from the
tort. 24 Damages, in such cases, are viewed as the present value of the
foregone income. 25 With the aid of expert testimony, ascertaining this
amount "involves simultaneous analysis of inflation, economic growth, in-
terest rates, taxes .... unemployment, personal consumption, value of
home services and fringe benefits." 26 Expert analysis is also given to aid in
the assessment of probable income increases, promotional possibilities,
and actuarial tables. 27
22. Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481,484, 558 P.2d 279,281 (1976).
23. See In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 581-84, 117 Cal.
Rptr.'49, 52-53 (1974); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 107-10, 113
Cal. Rptr. 58, 67-69 (1974); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 792-94, 78
Cal. Rptr. 131, 135-36 (1969); Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 405, 75
Cal. Rptr. 735, 737-38 (1969); Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 248-52,
301 P.2d 90, 94-96 (1956); Stem v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 345-48, 331 A.2d 257,
260-61 (1975) (while rejecting the classification of potential earning capacity as a
marital asset, held that professional goodwill was marital property; result might
have been more akin to Horstmann had the husband just come out of law school
and had there been a lack of traditional forms of property); Levene v. City of
Salem, 191 Or. 182, 199-201, 229 P.2d 255, 263-64 (1951). Butsee Nail v. Nail,
486 S.W.2d 761, 761-64 (Tex. 1972).
Methods of valuing goodwill have varied; each case seems to have been deter-
mined upon its own circumstances. Factors such as length of time of professional
practice, comparative success, age and health of the professional, past profits,
and the condition of the physical assets of the practice have been considered.
Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 484, 558 P2d. 279, 282 (1976).
24. See Scally v. W.T. Garratt & Co., 11 Cal. App. 138, 144, 104 P. 325,
328 (1909); De Haas v. Pennsylvania R.R., 261 Pa. 499, 503, 104 A. 733, 734
(1918); Wichita Valley Ry. v. Williams, 6 S.W.2d 439,442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1928).
See also Comment, Personal Injury Damages in Colorado, 35 COLO. L. REV.
332, 338 (1963).
25. Kirby, Tort Actions and the Economic Expert, 31 J. Mo. BAR 25, 26
(1975).
26. Id. at 26.
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Similar expert testimony could be employed in a divorce action like
Horstmann to determine the difference in earning potentials between a
spouse with a professional education and the same spouse without that
education. Although such a valuation technique could involve a con-
siderable degree of uncertainty, and has in fact been rejected by at least
one court for that reason, 28 it would yield a valuation no more speculative
than that which is well accepted in the area of tort law.
One remedy that would involve few dangers of speculation would be
restitution to the working spouse of money earned by that spouse but used
to pay for the other spouse's education. This would redistribute somewhat
the benefit to the student who has received a professional education paid
for by his spouse, and it would be relatively easy to value. In addition, it
could provide the supporting spouse something for her efforts without
treading upon what some courts consider hallowed ground- the personal
nature of the student's degree. Unfortunately, for all its ease of implemen-
tation, restitution does not really measure potential earning capacity; the
theory would fail to assign to the working spouse any portion of the educa-
tion's potential economic value. Restitution would give back to the suppor-
ting spouse the financial input of the past but would provide her no
realization of her expectation of economic benefit from the career for
which the education laid the foundation.2 9
A slightly more sophisticated version of the restitution method is the
"cost value" approachA0 Under this method, the value of the total cost of
the degree is restored to the supporting spouse to the extent attributable to
her. n' The total cost is determined by adding the direct purchase price of
the education to the indirect cost, i.e., the "cost opportunity" of the educa-
tion. The cost opportunity is measured as the amount of potential earnings
forgone during the period in which the student was engaged in his
studies.- 2 Because this approach takes into consideration cost opportunity,
it would be more beneficial to the supporting spouse than straight restitu-
tion of education expenses. But like restitution, cost value is not a true
measure of the worth of the final product of the degree. It does not
measure earning potential but only income denied the family because of
the education.
The valuation of the wife's marital interest should include a measure of
future earning capacity and, to be totally equitable, it should also consider
28. In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 76 (Colo. 1978) (such a com-
parison was made at trial level; reversed on appeal).
29. See Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Educa-
tion, 10 CAL. W.L. REv. 590, 592-97 (1974).
30. Id. at 603.
31. Due to the restitutionary nature of this theory, family expense statutes,
in those states that have such statutes, or the common law, may pose a barrier to
an equitable allotment to the supporting spouse. See notes 40-44 and accompany-
ing text infra.
32. Comment, supra note 29, at 603 n.75.
19'79] 335
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the independent effect that the husband's professional expertise will add
to his future earning capacity beyond what the wife helped provide him
during marriage. One commentator has proposed a method for valuing
potential earning capacity in which both of these elements would, to a
large extent, be present. 33 This formulation is premised upon the dif-
ference between potential earning capacity with and without the degree.
It takes into account three basic considerations: (1) any projection of
future income must include a projection of future tax liability; (2) earnings
do not increase at a constant rate and there are certain peak earning
periods; and (3) a determination must be made as to what portion of a
spouse's future income will be attributable to the educational experience
acquired during marriage. 34
Under this proposed approach, these three basic factors are con-
sidered in making an initial determination, with the aid of expert
testimony, of the difference between prospective income for each year of
the expected working life of the spouse with a professional education, and
what his prospective income would have been without that education.
Using a somewhat complicated formula employing a "sliding fraction," 35
the excess of the income expected as a professional over what would have
been earned without the professional degree is then attributed for each
year partly to the education and partly to acquired professional ex-
perience.3 6 Each subsequent year a smaller part of the excess income is at-
tributed to the professional degree and a larger part is deemed due to the
professional's experience. The total of the amounts deemed each year to
the professional degree will constitute the value of future earning capacity
which becomes marital property.
The existence of valuation tools such as those discussed here
demonstrates that future earning capacity may be characterized as marital
property without unmanageable difficulty. The method used to value the
future earning capacity must, however, not only be manageable but must
also be consistent with the theory underlying recognition of that capacity
as a marital asset. The Horstmann decision itself presents a paradox of
theory and method. There the court spoke of potential earning capacity
33. Id. at 604-12.
34. Id. at 607-12.
35. Id. at 609.
36. The following formula should be employed for the projected income of
each year in order to determine the amount of that income attributable to the
professional education acquired during marriage:
Number of Years of
r1e it Income Professional Education
Pr.fessiona (minus) Professional (times) Number of Years Since[
.Education J. Education jProfessional Education
Td. at 609-11. Commenced J
[Vol. 44
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and the need to provide the wife with some attainment for her loss of ex-
pectations, but then apparently proceeded to use restitution as the method
of assessment. This method, as noted earlier, neither measures the actual
worth of potential earning capacity nor provides the working spouse with
any of the future benefits that she expected from her financial input to the
other's education. The trial court seemed to base its total of $18,000 upon
Donna Horstmann's computations which added her income over the three
years of Randall's schooling to sums contributed by her parents for the
family's support and deducted Randall's earnings over this period.7 While
the Iowa Supreme Court recognized that there were other methods of
valuation, it concluded that there was nothing wrong with the one
employed by the trial court.3 8 Nowhere in Horstmann is there attempted a
valuation of Randall's potential earning capacity; only a muddled analysis
of family expenses and educational costs is presented.
This incongruity in the Horstmann decision is further compounded by
the type of restitution apparently awarded. Donna Horstmann did not
contribute to the cost of tuition, books, or fees. She supported the family
while Randall attended law school. Randall's education was paid for by his
loans, his employment, and a scholarship.3 9 Consequently, it seems that
Donna Horstmann was granted restitution not for money expended on
education costs but rather for money spent on family expense. The Iowa
court in Horstmann apparently did not consider Iowa's family expense
statute, which states that the "reasonable and necessary expenses of the
family... are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or
either of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or
separately. 40 Similarly worded family expense statutes have been passed in
several other jurisdictions. 41 Courts construing statutes such as this have
generally held that where there is no specific agreement to the contrary,
37. 263 N.W.2d at 887.
38. Id. at 891.
39. Id. at 886.
40. IOWA CODE § 597.14 (1971).
41. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-6-110 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 15
(1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 36-109 (1961); OR. REV. STAT. § 108.40
(1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-9 (1969); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205
(Supp. 1977). See also the last sentence of WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-201 (1977).
Other states have statutes which hold the wife or her property responsible for the
necessaries furnished to the family. See 41 AM. JUR. 2d Husband and Wife § 371
(1968); 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 64 (1944); 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMI-
LY LAWS § 160 (1935).
The initial purpose for enacting family expense statutes may have been to pro-
tect third party creditors. Family expense statutes were passed in many states at
the time of the Married Women's Property Acts. Because the husband no longer
controlled the wife's property, creditors had feared that the wife's separate pro-
perty would not be subject to payment of family debts. Family expense statutes
enabled creditors to hold the wife's property answerable for any family support
obligations. Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an In-
effective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558, 571 (1974).
1979]
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and the wife has voluntarily paid the family expenses, she has no claim
against the husband for reimbursement of those costs. 4 2 At the time
Horstmann was decided, Iowa precedent clearly indicated that there
should be no recovery by the wife for costs of keeping the family which she
paid during the marriage. 43 Since then, however, the Iowa Supreme Court
has overruled those cases and held that "nothing in the mutuality of the
statutory obligation forecloses a right of contribution be-
tween the parents when one has performed a duty the other should in
justice and equity have helped with."44 In jurisdictions where the issue is
undecided, or decided as previous Iowa law that there was no right to con-
tribution, a strong argument can be made for a similar reversal.
Although the Horstmann court can be lauded for its tacit, perhaps
even unconscious, foreshadowing of the reinterpretation of the state fami-
ly expense statute, the remedy it granted was inconsistent with the theory
which the court espoused for granting it. The award of future value of the
professional training or earning capacity is solely forward looking; the
amount of the award was based on the contribution of the wife to expenses
over the term of the marriage, a completely backward looking considera-
tion. The Horstmann court could have been much more consistent had it
used the sliding fraction approach or a similar method of valuation.
Unlike restitution or cost value, the sliding fraction method will provide an
42. This has been the majority holding under the common law in jurisdic-
tions with or without family expense statutes. E.g., See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778,
785, 415 P.2d 776, 781, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966); In re Marriage of Cosgrove, 27
Cal. App. 3d 424, 431, 103 Cal. Rptr. 733, 737 (1972); Agnew v. Agnew, 67
Colo. 81, 83, 185 P. 259,259 (1919); Hausser v. Ebinger, 161 Ohio St. 192, 196,
118 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1954). See also Annot., 101 A.L.R. 442 (1936). The Illinois
statute was patterned after the Iowa statute, and although the statute is not men-
tioned in the decisions, it is likely one ground for Illinois' consistent holdings that
reimbursement for family expenses incurred during the term of the marriage is
not available upon divorce. Spalding v. Spalding, 361 Ill. 387, 393-95, 198 N.E.
136, 139 (1935); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 45 Ill. App. 3d 880, 883, 360 N.E.2d
576, 579 (1977); Norris v. Norris, 16 Ill. App. 3d 879, 880-81, 307 N.E.2d 181,
182 (1974); Harnois v. Harnois, 10 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1067, 295 N.E.2d 511,
514-15 (1973). Analogous holdings denying reimbursement to the wife have been
the majority rule where the husband has used property from the wife's separate
estate with her knowledge and consent to pay for family expenses. See Colburn v.
Colburn, 262 Md. 333, 338, 278 A.2d 1, 4(1971); Murray v. Murray, 293 S.W.2d
436, 443 (Mo. 1956); T.G.W. Realties v. Long Island Bird Store, 151 Misc. 918,
922, 272 N.Y.S. 602, 606 (1934). But cf In re Estate of Trierweiler, 5 Wash.
App. 17, 23, 486 P.2d 314, 318 (1971) (Washington family expense statute, wife
entitled to be reimbursed from her deceased husband's estate).
43. Johnson v. Barnes, 69 Iowa 641, 644, 29 N.W. 759, 760 (1886); Cour-
tright v. Courtright, 53 Iowa 57, 59-60, 4 N.W. 824, 826 (1880). Cf Freet v.
Holdorf, 205 Iowa 1081, 1084, 216 N.W. 619, 620 (1927) (divorced wife could
not recover from her husband money expended by her to support herself and
their child, decision not based on statute).
44. Brown v. Brown, 269 N.W.2d 819 (Iowa 1978) (involving child support
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actual measure of an individual's potential earning capacity and will
thereby allot to the working spouse her share of future benefits that she
anticipated would flow because of the other spouse's professional educa-
tion.45 Perhaps the court in Horstmann did not utilize such a valuation ap-
proach because of the difficulty in application that would be involved.
Concededly, that type of approach is complex. However, the possibility
that the sliding fraction method of valuation may cause a court some dif-
ficulty to apply it must be weighed against the equitable demands for its
implementation.
Many courts have wrestled with the equitable problem arising where a
wife has provided support for a student spouse, only to be denied the an-
ticipated benefits of her husband's degree because of a divorce. 4 6 A seem-
ingly sound investment of the wife has netted her no return. "In short, the
student spouse will walk away with a degree and the supporting spouse will
depart with little more than the knowledge that he or she has substantially
contributed toward the attainment of that degree. '47
The efforts of both parties in a marriage where one partner is suppor-
ting the other through professional school are analogous to the building of
a business with good potential for the future of both individuals.48 The
supporting spouse has given up vital years of her life in which she could
have pursued further education or in some manner honed her own
marketable skills. The supporting spouse may even suffer a direct lessening
of earning potential where she has given up one career for inferior employ-
ment so that the student spouse might pursue a professional education. 49
Horstmann could strongly influence other jurisdictions troubled by
this syndrome of abrupt marital dissolution upon one partner's completion
of a professional education. There is a need to go beyond the constraints of
the traditional, narrow concepts of property so that courts will not remain
impotent in the midst of this social dilemma and can rectify present ine-
45. Comment, supra note 29, at 604-12.
46. E.g., Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973); In re
Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); Wheeler v.
Wheeler, 193 Neb. 615, 228 N.W.2d 594 (1975); Magruder v. Magruder, 190
Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
47. Comment, supra note 29, at 590.
48. The trial court in Horstmann asserted this. 263 N.W.2d at 887.
49. Cf In re Marriage of Beeh, 214 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa 1974) (the in-
terruption of an interesting and rewarding career of teaching nursing by sixteen
and one-half years of working as a homemaker and a mother make her employ-
ment opportunities at forty much less than they were at twenty-four); Brueg-
gemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977) (that
wife remains at home and cares for children and forgoes her opportunity to
develop a career or acquire job experience makes a determination of the wife's
earning capacity difficult or impossible); Conrad v. Conrad, 471 P.2d 892, 893
(Okla. 1969) (the earning capacity of the defendant was virtually destroyed by the
marriage, as she quit a promising position, tended the children, and briefly
worked in her husband's office to help make his osteopathic practice successful).
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